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Forum Juridicum
The Manifest Error Rule
George W. Hardy, Jr.*
(This paper was delivered during a panel discussion on the
LouisianaManifest ErrorRule at the Second Annual Conference
of the Judges of the Courts of Appeal, which was held in New
Orleans, Louisiana, on April 22, 1961. A Comment by David W.
Robertson, "Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases,"
appearing in 21 Louisiana Law Review 402 (1961), provided in
part the basis for the discussion.)
In the very beginning of this statement I wish to observe
that the so-called manifest error rule is a misnomer. Even a casual review of the opinions of all of our appellate tribunals reveals
the indisputable fact that in numerous instances they have
reversed judgments purely on the evaluation of questions of
facts which have not and could not be considered, under any
definition, as "manifest."
Adverting to the authority of Webster's New International
Dictionary of the English Language (1956) we find that the
adjective manifest is derived from the Latin manifestus, meaning "seized by the hand, palpable." The English word is defined
as "evident to the senses, especially to the sight; apparent; distinctly preceived; hence, obvious to the understanding; evident
to the mind; not obscure or hidden." The most appropriate
synonyms are given as "open, clear, visible, unmistakable, indubitable, indisputable, evident, self-evident."
Many of the factual errors adjudged by our appellate tribunals have failed in an extensive degree to bear any reasonable
analogy to the above definition.
The truth of the matter is that we have become accustomed
to reiterate the so-called "manifest error rule" time, after time,
after time; yet the effect of numerous opinions bears conclusive
evidence either of our complete disregard for or of our, sometimes not too subtle, change in the interpretation and application
of the rule.
*Judge, Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, State of Louisiana.
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In all fairness it should be noted that many of our opinions
contain a statement to the effect that:
"We find no error, manifest or otherwise, in the judgment
appealed from."
The author of the exhaustive discussion of the rule under
consideration,' has traced its somewhat obscure origin as far
back as the year 1823, to the case of Moore v. Angiolette,2 in
which the court stated:
"We agree in the conclusions of the district judge, whose
decision, on questions of fact, always prevails in this court,
unless manifestly erroneous."
In the attempt to find the reason, or lack thereof, for this
pronouncement, I have made an admittedly cursory examination
of some earlier cases and have culled therefrom the following
expressions which appear to me to have some bearing upon the
true meaning of the "manifest error" phrase.
In Livingston v. Cornell' the opinion of the court contains
the following statement:
"The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff.
"If this verdict be set aside, it must be because it is contrary to evidence or contrary to law.... Whatever may be
the opinion of the judges on this point, it is believed that the
question was properly of the cognizance of the jury, and the
court cannot say that they were without evidence, or decided
contrary thereto." (Emphasis added.) 4
In Cavelier & Petit v. Collins5 the court declared:
"In reversing the decision of inferior tribunals, the great
and primary object is to see that justice may be done, or
that the law be not mistaken and violated; and it is certainly
of little consequence by what mode of reasoning the judge
forms his opinion, provided that, taken entire, it comports
with the law, and due justice to the parties litigant."
In Trimble's Syndics v. New Orleans Insurance Co.6 the court
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Comment, 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 402 (1961).
12 Mart. (O.S.) 532, 533 (La. 1823).
2 Mart.(O.S.) 281 (La. 1812).
Id. at 282.
3 Mart.(O.S.) 188, 189 (La. 1813).
3 Mart.(O.S.) 394 (La. 1814).
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commented that the only issue was whether a ship, mentioned
in the policy of insurance on which the action was founded,
was seaworthy at the time she left New Orleans. After expressing considerable doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion
reached by the jury on the basis of facts, the court concluded:
"A variety of testimony as it appears from the statement
of facts, was offered to the jury who tried the cause in the
court below: we must presume that they weighed and discussed it as they ought to have done; and under the existing
circumstances of this case, taken altogether, we are of the
opinion, that this verdict, and the judgment rendered thereon, ought not be disturbed."' 7 (Emphasis added.)
Two most enlightening observations are contained in the
opinion of the court in Abat v. Doliolle :
"This case is a glaring instance of the difficulties in which
courts involve themselves, by suffering the looseness of practice which generally prevails. The law, which requires that
issues should be made and submitted to the jury, is disregarded, and juries, without any legal clue, endeavor to extricate themselves from the perplexing situation in which
they are placed....
"A jury have legal means of informationnot equally within the reach of a court; they know the character of the parties, and the weight to which the testimony of each witness
is entitled." (Emphasis added.)
It seems to me that the logical basis for the establishment of
the principle which has since, unfortunately, been converted into
the manifest error rule, is to be found in the great weight originally given to the factual findings of judges and juries of the
vicinage who were presumed to possess and apply their personal
knowledge of the character and reputation of the witnesses who
appeared before them and to weigh the consequent value of their
testimony. This conclusion is not based upon some imaginary
or far-fetched reason. The predicate has many times been enunciated by our appellate courts which are prone to declare that
the trial judge (or jury) is in a better position to know the witnesses, to observe their conduct and demeanor on the witness
stand, and, consequently, to evaluate the weight of their testi7. Id. at 396.

8. 4 Mart.(O.S.) 316, 327 (La. 1816).
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mony more exactly than appellate tribunals whose examination
of a case is confined to the cold, naked representation of a written record.
If these reasons were originally valid, I submit the proposition that such validity has substantially deteriorated due to obvious practical changes in the times and conditions in which we
live. To say that trial judge or jury sitting in large centers of
population, knows the witnesses, their characters, personal idiosyncrasies, reputations, etc., is a violent and unwarranted assumption. I think it is equally unfounded to conclude that the
demeanor of a witness on trial of a case necessarily provides a
fair and just basis for the evaluation of the credibility and validity of his testimony. Some individuals whom I know to be possessed in the highest degree of personal honor and complete integrity, would suffer such embarrassment, nervousness and discomfort upon the witness stand in a formal legal trial that their
demeanor might well give the impression of such confusion and
result in such discrepancies as to make their testimony appear
incredible.
As a plain matter of fact the manifest error rule is subject to
so many exceptions in our jurisprudence, that in my opinion it
should be discarded. By way of illustration let me refer to what
I regard as a classic example, namely, the case of Norman v.
State,9 finally decided by the Supreme Court after granting
writs.
The cited case was originally tried before a jury which,
unable to reach an agreement, was discharged. A second trial
was had by a jury which returned a verdict, in favor of the
plaintiff, by a nine to three division. Judgment in accordance
with the verdict was rendered by the trial judge and a motion
for a new trial was overruled. On appeal to the Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit the judgment was amended (as to quantum) and affirmed, with one member of the court dissenting.
Writs were granted by the Supreme Court and there was judgment reversing the judgments of the trial court and the court of
appeal and dismissing plaintiff's suit, two judges dissenting
therefrom and one judge being recused. An analysis of the opinions would show the following result:
9. 217 La. 904, 80 So.2d 858 (1955).
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FOR THE PLAINTIFF
Jurors
Trial Judge
Judges of the Court of Appeal
Justices of the Supreme
Court

FOR THE DEFENDANT
3 Jurors
1 Judge of the Court of Appeal
4 Justices of the Supreme
Court

If we wish to accept and follow the manifest error rule, the
above divisions would appear to be impossible.
Further commenting upon the same case it is to be noted
that the majority opinion of the court of appeal contains the following observation:
"Proceeding to a consideration of the merits of the case we
observe that only questions of fact are concerned."' 0
The dissenting opinion contained the following observation:
"First, I think the plea of contributory negligence is inescapable for the reason that beyond any reasonable doubt a
warning sign bearing the words 'Load Limit 3 Tons' was in
place and staring plaintiff in the face when he attempted to
cross the bridge with a loaded truck weighing twenty-nine
(29) tons. The presence of the sign in place or not is the
crux of the issue of contributory negligence specially plead
by defendant. The opinion avoids a specific finding as to
whether the sign was there, but inferentially holds it was
not. Therein lies mnaifest error."" (Emphasis added.)
The above observation was reiterated in the Supreme Court
opinion as follows:
"It can thus be seen that the question of the presence or
absence of the sign became the vital issue in the case.
"An examination of the judgment of the Court of Appeal
reveals that the prevailing opinion does not take an affirmative stand on this question but concludes that, since the plaintiff had satisfied a majority of the jury that the sign was
not there, its verdict should not be disturbed."' 2
The opinion of the Supreme Court did not go so far as to mention manifest error but declared:
10. 69 So. 2d 120, 123 (La. App. 1953).
11. Id. at 135.
12. 227 La. 904, 911, 80 So.2d 858, 861 (1955).
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"On all counts, we find the testimony of the State's witnesses
to be superior to that given by plaintiff's witnesses ...
"
13
(Emphasis added.)
The conclusion is inescapable that both the dissenting opinion
in the court of appeal and the majority opinon of the Supreme
Court predicated the ultimate conclusions upon the evaluation of
the nature and weight of the testimony of the witnesses on trial.
Adherence to the manifest error rule would preclude such consideration, for, concededly, one of the most persuasive reasons
for the rule lies in the oft-asserted declaration that the trial
judge or jury is better qualified than the judges of appellate
courts to make such an evaluation.
Finally I would like to observe that, in my opinion, our adherence, even by lip service, to the manifest error rule is undesirable, primarily for the reason that errors of fact, even though
not manifest, frequently result in unjust and inequitable conclusions which are as highly prejudicial to a party litigant as if the
errors had been obvious. It is further appropriate to point out
the fact that in many cases in which the trial judges fail to render written opinions, or in doing so omit an analysis of pertinent
and material testimony, an appellate court is unable to determine
with any certainty the impressions of the trial judge as to the
value and effect of such testimony.
In conclusion let me say that it is my individual opinion that
we should abandon the interminable recital of a theoretical adherence to the manifest error rule in favor of an approach which
would permit the exercise of sound discretion in the consideration and determination of facts upon a basis of any prejudicial
error which may be reflected by the record on appeal. It matters not to me whether this procedure be denominated as "clearly erroneous," "substantially erroneous," or "reversible error."
By whatever name, so long as we are the judges of fact as well
as law, our utmost efforts must always be directed toward
achieving the ultimate purposes of justice.
13. Id. at 915, 80 So.2d at 862.

